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Neuroscience as a Basis for the Transformation of Bifurcated Liability in Tort  
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In September 2012, Mark Ratner underwent a surgical procedure at Massachusetts General 
Hospital.1 When Ratner awoke from the surgery, he was afflicted with “confusion, delirium, and 
hallucinations.”2 Ratner’s symptoms got worse as time went on, and he was later readmitted to the 
hospital and placed with a “1:1 sitter” as part of his treatment plan.3 During one particular 
manifestation of his symptoms, Ratner became agitated and “grabbed [the sitter’s] arm and twisted 
it up behind her head.”4 When the sitter later sued Ratner for negligently injuring her, he argued 
that the “delirium” from which he was suffering at the time of the incident should be considered 
in determining his appropriate duty of care.5 Relying on the Third Restatement’s rule concerning 
the overall standard of liability for negligence, however, the Essex County Superior Court held 
that Ratner’s mental disability was not a defense to negligence, and that the duty of care that he 
owed to the sitter was that of a reasonable adult without the disability.6 
The discourse surrounding mental illness has become more robust throughout the 2010s; 
most Americans exhibit a generalized awareness of mental disorders and their treatment.7 But a 
much smaller percentage of people believe that the general population is caring and sympathetic 
 
1 Gioia v. Ratner, No. 1477CV00676, 2016 WL 4729355, at *1 (Mass. Super. Aug. 9, 2016) 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at *2. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Over 80% of adults surveyed. Rosemarie Kobau et al., Attitudes Toward Mental Illness: Results from the Behavioral 
Risk Factor Surveillance System, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 10 (2012), 
https://www.cdc.gov/hrqol/Mental_Health_Reports/pdf/BRFSS_Full%20Report.pdf.  
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towards those with mental illness, and those who suffer with symptoms of mental illness are even 
more skeptical of these attitudes.8 Even in countries with more developed systems of mental health 
care, such as Sweden, almost 25% of those surveyed believe that “people with mental illness 
commit violent acts more than others.”9 In fact, in a 2014 survey, its respondants stated that mental 
illness carries a greater societal stigma than physical disability.10 
Advancements in neuroscience have the potential to change the way mental illness is 
viewed, scientifically, practically, and societally. Research which highlights the organic nature of 
these conditions will challenge the usual perception of mental illness.11 And neuroscientific 
developments and practices have started to trickle into the law, holding promise for future growth.12 
As the intersection between neuroscience and the law continues to increase in viability and 
practice, the use of neuroscience-based evidence and rationales in the criminal courtroom has 
progressed in a relatively linear fashion, and defendants have “sought to use [this evidence] at all 
phases of criminal adjucation”.13 On the other hand, applications of neuroscience in the civil 
context have remained largely theoretical.14 But neuroscience’s ability to transform how the law 
views a person’s mental state—particularly as it pertains to definitions of “culpability” and 
 
8 Id. The percentage of people who agree with this proposition increased when compated to a similar 1976 study. Id. 
9 Helia F. Mirnezami et al., Changes in Attitudes Towards Mental Disorders and Psychiatric Treatment 1976-2014 in 
a Swedish Population, 70 NORDIC J. OF PSYCH. 33, 38 (2016). 
10 Id. 
11 See, e.g., Murat Yucel & Dan Lubman, Neurocognitive and Neumimaging Evidence of Behavioral Dysregulation 
in Human Drug Addiction: Implications for Diagnosis, Treatment, and Prevention, 26 DRUG & ALCOHOL REV. 33, 
34 (2007); J. David Jentsch & Jane R. Taylor, Impulsivity Resulting from Frontostriatal Dysfunction in Drug Abuse: 
Implications for the Control of Behavior by Reward Related Stimuli, 146 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 373, 381 (1999) 
(studies highlighting the organic nature of addction). 
12 See generally John Cookson, How Neuroscience is Changing the Law, BIG THINK, (Oct. 1, 2010), 
https://bigthink.com/going-mental/how-neuroscience-is-changing-the-law (highlighting early developments 
regarding neuroscience in the criminal courtroom and outlining possible future uses). 
13 Joan M. Eggen & Eric J. Laury, Toward a Neuroscience Model of Tort Law: How Functional Neuroimaging Will 
Transform Tort Doctrine, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 235, 237 (2012) (comparing the use of neuroscientific 
evidence in criminal versus tort law).  
14 Id. 
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“injury”— is just as important in civil cases as it is under the criminal law.15 
 The development of this area of study has the potential to remedy a long-standing defect 
in the law of negligence. As it currently stands, the common law (and statutes) imposes a so-called 
“bifurcated” approach for adult tortfeasors, where their physical conditions may be considered in 
determining liability, but their mental conditions are cast aside.16 The animating rationale behind 
this rule is administrative feasibility.17 Put simply, many believe that it is easier and more effective 
to establish and litigate the existence of a physical condition as opposed to a mental one.18 Many 
have argued in the academic literature for the transformation of this rule, and developments in 
neuroscience have added a new tenor to their premises.19 These developments give credence to the 
idea that mental conditions are “organic” in nature and can be objectively verifiable.20 As such, 
they should generally be treated akin to physical conditions when it comes to tort liability. 
 While the overall argument for a neuroscience-based “unification” of physical and mental 
conditions in tort is welcome, the solutions proposed by the current literature are deficient. The 
most popular solutions call for a standard which mirrors that of physical ailments—that courts 
should considere “significantly and objectively verifiable” or “demonstrably organic” mental 
conditions.21 Alternatively, scholars have argued that tort law ought to embrace certain exceptions 
to the objective reasonable standard for those with mental illnesses, impose strict liability on 
 
15 Id. 
16 Williams v. Hays, 38 N.E. 449, 450 (N.Y. 1894) (articulating the English common law rationales for the bifurcated 
rule). 
17 See, e.g., Hays at 450; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §283B (1965). 
18 Id. 
19 See, e.g., Harry J. F. Korrell, The Liability of Mentally Disabled Tort Defendants, 19 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 45 
(1995) (providing a logical critique of the bifurcated rule); Joan M. Eggen, Mental Disabilities and Duty in Negligence 
Law: Will Neuroscience Reform Tort Doctrine? 12 IND. HEALTH LAW REV. 235, 618-619, (2015) (arguing that the 
admission of neuroscientific evidence in tort cases can pave the way for a change to the bifurcated rule). 
20 See Eggen, supra note 19, at 633.  
21 See, e.g., Eggen & Laury, supra note 13, at 240; Eggen, supra note 19, at 645. 
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mentally ill tort defendants, and impute knowledge of cognitive diversity on tort plaintiffs.22 
 This paper argues that neuroscience supports the notion that physical and mental conditions 
should no longer be bifurcated for the purposes of adult tortfeasor liability. Additionally, this paper 
contends that, in order to be sufficiently transformative and commensurate with both the state of 
neuroscience as well as the legal community’s concerns regarding adult tortfeasor liability, 
requiring a defendant’s mental illness to be “objectively verifiable” is too high a standard. Rather, 
a defendant seeking to show a mental condition should be required to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that he or she suffers from a “significant” condition. Once this standard is met, the 
court should treate the mental illness like a physical condition for the purposes of determining her 
relevant standard of care. 
 Part II of this paper introduces the bifurcated rule as well as its traditional and current 
rationales. It also examines certain “pre-neuroscience” criticisms of the bifurcated rule. Part III  
provides an overview of the neuroscientific technology and techniques currently discussed in legal 
literature, which have the potential to transform adult tortfeasor liability. This part also discusses 
this technology’s potential and criticisms as well as some responses to those critiques. Part IV of 
this paper examines the most notable issues that arise in the application of neuroscientific 
principles to adult tortfeasor liability. It further addresses how neuroscientific evidence might 
tackle some of these concerns, as well as how this evidence might comport with evidentiary 
principles. Part V introduces the current proposed solutions for “unifying” physical and mental 
conditions in tort liability and highlights their deficiencies. It then proposes a hybridized standard 
of proof as to the existence of mental conditions, the showing of a “significant” mental condition 
by a preponderance of the evidence.. Part VI concludes the paper. It surveys the current and future 
 
22 See Johnny Criscoe & Lisa Lukasik, Re-Examining Reasonableness: Negligence Liability in Adult Defendants with 
Cognitive Disabilities, 6 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 18–19. 
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landscape of tort law and neuroscience, and reiterates that any solution to the issue of bifurcated 
adult tortfeasor liability must be sufficiently transformative to accommodate the associated public 
policy issues as well as the nature of neuroscientific evidence as it currently stands and continues 
to develop. 
II. An Introduction to the Bifurcated Rule: History and Perspectives 
 In order to develop an understanding of how neuroscience can support the transformation 
of the bifurcated rule, one must first understand the bifurcated rule itself. This section will first 
explain the origins of the bifurcated rule, and discuss its underpinning justifications, which have 
persisted from the 1800s to today. It will then provide some “pre-neuroscience” arguments against 
the bifurcated rule, and address some limited exceptions to the rule that have been promulgated by 
various courts. 
A. The History of the Bifurcated Rule 
“The traditional premise for tort liability is fault, or ‘blameworthiness.’”23 As it pertains to 
both intentional torts and negligence, fault (or blame) is defined in the context of mental states.24 
“The actor in negligence law is always the reasonably prudent person, [and is] judged by that 
(objective) standard, not what he or she subjectively knew or intended.”25 When it comes to 
determining the “reasonable person” standard that applies to an alleged adult tortfeasor, the current 
model in tort law dictates that mental conditions are irrelevant. In essence, an individual who 
suffers from a mental condition is held to the same standard as someone who does not.26  
Tort law, however, allows for adjustments to the “reasonable person” standard in other 
circumstances. Most notably, where an alleged tortfeasor suffers from a physical disability, that 
 
23 Eggen, supra note 19, at 593 (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 109 (1881)). 
24 Id. 
25 Eggen & Laury, supra note 13, at 262. 
26 See supra notes 16−19 and accompanying text. 
 6 
disability is factored into their relevant standard of care—the reasonableness standard is that of an 
adult with that same condition.27 Additionally, a child’s mental condition is considered for the 
purposes of determining a child’s applicable standard of care in the same way as a physical 
condition.28 This inherent inequity in the law, where physical conditions are factored into tortfeasor 
liability, and mental conditions are not, is often referred to as the “bifurcated rule.”29 
Although references to the bifurcated rule extend as far back as the 1600’s, the most 
commonly cited source for the rule is Williams v. Hays.30 There, the New York Court of Appeals 
considered a negligence action where a shipowner accused its shipmaster of negligently allowing 
the ship to wreck.31 The shipmaster had been piloting the ship for two straight days and, under the 
influence of a large dose of quinine, went to sleep and left the ship in the care of his mates.32 The 
mates awoke the captain when an emergency arose; the captain then took control of the ship and 
subsequently crashed it.33 The shipmaster claimed that he could not be liable for negligence, as the 
sleeplessness and the quinine had rendered him “unconscious” and “insane” at the time of the 
accident.34 The Court agreed that the shipmaster “had no free will” at the time of the accident, but 
nevertheless held that the shipmaster was liable for negligence on the grounds that “[t]he general 
rule is that an insane person is just as responsible for his torts as a sane person, and the rule applies 
to all torts.”35  
 
27 Id. 
28 Eggen, supra note 19, at 595. 
29 Id. at 268.  
30 38 N.E. 449 (N.Y. 1894). 
31 Id. at 446. 
32 Id. at 445. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 446.  
35 Id. at 446, 454. 
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The bifurcated rule quickly became entrenched as an irrefutable principle in tort and 
negligence cases. With some limited exceptions, the rule still almost universally applies today.36 
The subjective standard for mental conditions, however, is still applied in certain limited areas of 
tort, for example, as a means of refuting the defense of “consent to the risk” or, as previously 
mentioned, as a factor in the formulation of the “reasonable child” standard.37 
B. Rationales for the Bifurcated Rule: What’s Old is New 
i. The Hays Rationales 
The Hays court elucidated three major public policy rationales in support of the bifurcated 
rule.38 First, as between two innocent parties, the person who caused the injury must bear the loss.39 
Second, public policy favors a rule that encourages persons with an interest in the estate of a 
mentally ill person to take measures in order to prevent that person from harming others.40 And 
finally, such a rule discourages persons from feigning mental illness to avoid liability for their 
tortious conduct.41 
ii. Second Restatement Rationales 
The stated rationales in support of the bifurcated rule provided by the American Law 
Institute (ALI) in the Second Restatement of Torts, which was published in 1965, do not materially 
vary from those advanced by Hays and related cases in the late 1800s. The Second Restatement’s 
bifurcated rule rationales include: (1) the difficulties in distinguishing “mental deficiency” from 
“variations of temperament, intellect and emotional balance;” (2) the “ease with which” fabrication 
of mental illness may occur; (3) the need to, if those with mental conditions “are to live in the 
 
36 See, e.g., McIntyre v. Sholty, 13 N.E. 239, 340 (Ill. 1887) (explaining that “[i]t is well settled that, though a lunatic 
is not punishable criminally, he is liable for a civil action for any tort he may commit”). 
37 Eggen, supra note 19, at 601−02. 
38 Hays, 38 N.E. at 447−50; id. at 598. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
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world,” compensate persons they injure; and (4) the encouragement of caretakers to prevent those 
with mental conditions from doing harm to others.42 
iii. Third Restatement Rationales 
In recent years, the ALI has backed away somewhat from its 1965 rhetoric, but has 
continued to stick with the bifurcated rule.43 “To be sure,” the ALI acknowledges in a comment on 
its most recent Restatment of Torts, “modern society is increasingly inclined to treat physical and 
mental disabilities similarly, and this inclination is supported by the recognition that many mental 
disabilities have organic causes.”44 But “the awkwardness experienced by the criminal-justice 
system in attempting to litigate the insanity defense” as well as other administrative difficulties, 
they argue, support the continued retention of the bifurcated rule.45 The rest of the comment 
demonstrates, however, that vestiges of the bifurcated rule that date back to 1965, and even 1894, 
remain powerful. The ALI contends that “[l]imited or moderate mental disorders” are too difficult 
to evaluate and do not generally account for one’s actions, consideration of mental disability by 
courts would be too defendant-friendly and that “there can be doubts as to whether the [mentally 
ill] person should be allowed to engage in the normal range of society’s activities.”46  
 The bifurcated rule was tenuous in nature when it was introduced; as early as 1887, courts 
acknowledged that “however justly this doctrine may have been subject to criticism, on the 
grounds of reason and principle,” the bifurcated rule had earned its place as black letter law due to 
the “weight of authority.”47 Continued academic critiques of the rule have only rendered its 
stability as a doctrine all the more unconvincing today. “The rule continues to be the majority rule 
 
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §283B (1965). 
43 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §11(c) (2010). 
44 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §11 cmt. e (2010). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Eggen, supra note 19, at 599 (quoting McIntyre, 13 N.E. at 24). 
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despite regular criticism over many decades, not because it is a good rule but because it is a familiar 
and convenient rule.”48 
C. Traditional Criticism of the Bifurcated Rule 
i. Case Studies 
Academics have pointed to a wealth of case law which plainly lay out the contradictions 
and administrative quirks of the bifurcated rule.49 In Johnson v. Lambotte,50 a highly-medicated 
inpatient, who a hospital was treating for paranoid schizophrenia, escaped the hospital, walked 
eight blocks, and entered an empty car with the motor running. She drove off in the vehicle and 
got into multiple accidents, injuring herself and others.51  
In the subsequent personal injury action, the defendant argued that she had no ability to 
distinguish between what was right and wrong and, therefore, did not act negligently. Although 
the court judged the defendant to be a “mental incompetent", it nevertheless applied the bifurcated 
rule and found the defendant liable, as the applicable standard of care was a reasonable 
unmedicated person without paranoid schizophrenia.52 “Cases such as Johnson impose an 
objective standard—the reasonable person without mental disabilities—on adults with mental 
disabilities.”53 This, in effect, creates de facto strict liability for individuals with mental conditions, 
because defendants with conditions as severe as the one at hand in Johnson are simply unable to 
comply with the reasonable person standard.54  
 
48 Id. at 595. 
49 Id. at 603−04. 
50 363 P.2d 165, 166 (Colo. 1961). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Eggen, supra note 1, at 603-04. 
54 See, e.g., Ramey v. Knorr, 124 P.3d 314, 316 (Wash Ct. App. 2005) (applying the bifurcated rule to a woman who, 
due to paranoid schizophrenia, thought she was mistaken suspect of a criminal conspiracy and negligently drove a 
car). 
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 The application of the bifurcated rule along with the exceptions outlined in Section II.A 
can also lead to strange outcomes. For example, in Burch v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co.,55 a 
court did not consider a defendant’s “mental retardation” in determining whether she was liable 
for plaintiff’s injury when she allegedly caused a pickup truck to lurch backward and hit him. With 
little discussion, the court held that the bifurcated rule controlled, and defendant did not fit into a 
narrow Wisconsin exception regarding caretakers of the mentally ill.56 That same court, however, 
found that in assessing whether defendant’s father was contributorily negligent, his knowledge of 
his daughter’s condition could be considered.57 The court went into great detail on this issue, 
explaining because the father, “knowing [his daughter’s] limitations . . . left her alone in the 
frontseat of the truck with the gearshift in reverse,” he must bear some of the blame for the 
accident.58 Inexplicably, these evident “limitations” were more legally relevant to defendant’s 
father than the defendant herself. 
ii. Refuting the Hays Rationales 
Even without the use of neuroscientific evidence, critics of the bifurcated rule have offered 
evidence to refute the proffered rationales of Hays. The first such rationale is that, between two 
innocent parties, the party who caused the injury must bear liability. But this reasoning has been 
“rejected in nearly every other arena,” and most black letter tort law is based on the principle “that, 
absent fault (negligence, recklessness, or intention) justifying a shift, loss from an accident must 
lie where it falls.”59 
 
55 543 N.W.2d 277 (Wis. 1996). 
56 Id. at 280. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 281. 
59 Harry J. F. Korrell, The Liability of Mentally Disabled Tort Defendants, 19 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 45 (1995) 
(emphasis added). 
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The second traditional rationale, that the bifurcated rule encourages caretakers to prevent 
mentally ill individuals from harming others, is no longer relevant today.60 First, negligent 
supervision doctrines have rendered the need for this rationale mostly obsolete.61 Second, this 
rationale “relies on the assumption that custodians are aware of the potential liabilities” implied 
by the bifurcated rule, when the rule is not widely known and, in fact, is counterintuitive to many.62 
Finally, this line of logic is simply outdated, reflective of “a time when the treatment of the 
mentally disabled differed from other methods,” and more rigorous and normative medical 
treatment of mental illnesses of disorders were uncommon outside of institutionalization.63 
The final traditional rationale of the bifurcated rule, that the lack of such a rule would allow 
those faced with tortious negligence to simply feign mental illness in order to escape liability, is 
largely based on an irrational fear.64 In the criminal law, the insanity defense is rarely invoked by 
defendants, despite the fact that it would arguably be more valuable to feign mental illness in this 
context given the liberty interests at hand.65 In fact, the percentage of criminal defendants (1-2%) 
that invoke the insanity defense is consistent with the estimated percentage of the population who 
actually suffer from chronic, severe mental illnesses.66 And further studies indicate that those who 
plead the insanity defense are in fact mentally ill.67 
 This rationale also fails to take into account that there are numerous deterrents to feigning 
mental illness in a legal context. Feigning mental illness would not only open oneself up to the 
pervasive societal stigmas associated with a public diagnosis, but would also allow for the possible 
 
60 Id. at 29. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 29−30. 
64 Elizabeth J. Goldstein, Asking the Impossible: The Negligence Liability of the Mentally Ill, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH 
L. & POL’Y 67, 75 (1995) (explaining that the “[f]ear of widespread feigning of mental illness is unfounded”). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 76. 
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use of mental health evidence in civil commitment proceedings.68 Even if all of these mitigating 
factors are discounted, courts already distinguish “legitimate from non-legitimate claims of 
cognitive disability” in other contexts, such as “contract, probate, health care, family law, criminal 
law, and [negligence cases involving children].”69 
iii. Judicial Pushback to the Bifurcated Rule 
A few courts have recognized the inherent problems of the bifurcated rule and promulgated 
limited exceptions, often citing public policy and equitable concerns. Wisconsin has expanded the 
“sudden incapacitation” defense to negligence, where the onset of a physical condition causes an 
accident, to mental illness.70 And New Jersey and Indiana permit a tort defendant’s mental 
condition to be factored into the relevant standard of care when the individual is institutionalized 
for that condition.71 But these doctrines are usually limited in their scope to specific situations, 
such as where the plaintiff in a negligence action was defendant’s caretaker.72 
III. Enter Neuroscience: Uses, Potential, and Limitations 
 With an understanding of the bifurcated rule in mind, one can now look to the fundementals 
of neuroscience in the courtroom, and begin to observe how these technologies may contribute to 
the transformation of the rule. This section will briefly trace the development of relevant 
neuroscientific technologies, optimistically highlighting their potential  benefits and drawbacks in 
the courtroom. It will then highlight tort specifically, explaining how an organic understanding of 
mental conditions might radically reshape the notion of “the reasonable person”. 
 
68 Id. 
69 Criscoe & Lukasik, supra note 22, at 30. 
70 Breunig v. American Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619 (Wis. 1970). 
71 See, e.g., Creasy v. Rusk, 730 N.E.2d 659, 666−67 (Ind. 2000) (applying the doctrine in the context of an 
Alzheimer’s patient who was injured caregivers); Berberian v. Lynn 809 A.2d 865, 873 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2002) (same); see also Gould v. American Family Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 282, 283 (Wis. 1996) (permitting the 
consideration of the defendant’s mental condition where caretaker knew or should have known of her condition). 
72 Id. 
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A. An Introduction to “New Neuroscience” 
Although recent developments have shifted the paradigm of possibility in our 
understanding and study of the human brain, “versions of the brain scan technologies currently 
capturing the law’s attention have been in use for decades.”73 This technology has “evolved 
significantly over time, from the basic static x-ray technology to more complicated technologies 
that seek to understand how various areas of the subject’s brain are functioning in real time.”74 
Early, more conventional techniques, such as cranial computed tomography (CT) scans and 
electroencephalograms (EEG), allowed scientists to gain preliminary insights into the structure of 
the brain and various structural abnormalities, as well as measure so-called “brain waves” by 
recording the electrical impulses of the brain through electrodes.75 
B. “New Neuroscience” Technologies 
Modern advances in neuroscientific technology, referred to by professors Jean M. Eggen 
and Eric J. Laury as “new neuroscience”, allow practicioners to hone in on more precise elements 
of brain function.76 A positron emission tomography (PET) scan measures the level of function in 
various parts of the brain.77 This is done by injecting small levels of radioactive chemicals into a 
subject, and then observing how that radioactivity manifests in different parts of the brain over 
time.78 A single photon emission computed tomography (SPEGT) scan marries this technology 
with a CT scan, making possible three-dimensional modeling of blood flow through the brain’s 
veins and arteries.79 Finally, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) permits the 
 
73 Eggen & Laury, supra note 13, at 240. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Henry T. Greely & Anthony D. Wagner, Reference Guide on Neuroscience, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE  747, 801 (2011). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 975; Eggen & Laury supra note 13, at 240. 
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observance of real-time brain function by adding blood oxygen levels and the dilation of blood 
vessels into the pool of simultaneously observable characteristics.80 Although there is some debate 
as to the effectiveness of all these techniques, fMRI is considered to be the most effective brain 
function measuring technology currently available.81 
Neural imaging has the potential to provide new information concerning the organic nature 
of mental illness.82 Case studies have already emerged, for example, that use fMRI to link 
abnormalities in certain areas of the brain to addiction83 and schizophrenia.84 There is also hope 
that these technologies could result in more accurate, scientific assessments of pain and emotional 
distress, which would be useful evidence in proving damages.85  
C. Three Macro Criticisms of “New Neuroscience” 
 Critiques of “new neuroscience” technologies and their significance generally hone in on 
two key issues. The first is the role of scientists in interpreting neuroscientific results, and the 
second is a tendency by those same scientists to overstate the meaning of those results.86 Centered 
around these concerns, a few more specific criticisms relevant to how neuroscience interacts with 
the law, as well as responses to those criticisms, are offered here.  
i. fMRIs are not Records of Brain Function 
 
80 Center for Functional MRI, What is fMRI?, UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO SCHOOL OF MEDICINE (2019), 
http://fmri.ucsd.edu/Research/whatisfmri.html. 
81 Eggen & Laury, supra note 13, at 241. 
82 Id. at 245. 
83 See, e.g., Murat Yucel & Dan Lubman, Neurocognitive and Neumimaging Evidence of Behavioral Dysregulation 
in Human Drug Addiction: Implications for Diagnosis, Treatment, and Prevention, 26 DRUG & ALCOHOL REV. 33, 
34 (2007); J. David Jentsch & Jane R. Taylor, Impulsivity Resulting from Frontostriatal Dysfunction in Drug Abuse: 
Implications for the Control of Behavior by Reward Related Stimuli, 146 Psychopharmacology 373, 381 (1999). 
84 See Gene Ostrovsky, Scientists Obtain New Functional Imagery of Schizophrenia, MEDGADGET (2009). 
85 See generally Michael E. Robinson et. al, Pain Measurement and Brain Activity: Will Neuroimages Replace Pain 
Ratings?, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 350 (Owen D. Jones et al., eds. 2014). 
86 See Martha J. Farah, Brain Images, Babies, and Bathwater: Critiquing Critiques of Functional Neuroimaging, in 
SPECIAL REPORT: INTERPRETING NEUROIMAGES: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TECHNOLOGY AND ITS LIMITS, HASTINGS 
CTR. RPT. S19, S23 (Mar. 2014). 
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 One critique of new neuroscience is that “functional brain images are easily misunderstood 
as photographs of brain function,” and as a result, their meaning is limited at best, and misleading 
at worst87 In reality, “[an images’] meaning turns on sophisticated interpretational techniques.”88 
Poor spatial and temporal resolutions of fMRIs often create an imprecise representation of neural 
activity, leaving neuroscientists to “fudge” the connections between single cell activity and larger 
brain patterns.89 But neuroscience researcher Martha J. Farah, in defending fMRI relevance, offers 
that “little of what we call science involves direct observation of the subject at interest,” and 
cosmologists, chemists, and climate scientists often make similar inferences.90 “There is indeed a 
‘cause and effect’ relationship” she states, "between neural activity and blood oxygenation levels, 
even if the nature of that relationship is imperfectly understood.”91  
ii. Images of fMRIs are “Researcher Inventions” 
 The limitations mentioned in the preceding paragraph often require researchers to make 
decisions pertaining to what activity to represent in visual depictions and how to represent it.92 
“The worry” among those skeptical of the usefulness of fMRI “is that the images are more 
researcher inventions than researchers observations.”93 One area of particular concern is the use of 
color coding and scales to exaggerate certain activity or to draw a correlation where there may not, 
in fact, be one.94 But defenders retort that, while “choices of color scale or contrast affect the 
 
87 Id. 
88 Eggen & Laury, supra note 13, at 242; Farah, supra note 84, at S24 (noting that “it’s a stretch to say that there is a 
cause and effect to relate this blood surge [measured by fMRIs] to a specific activity”). 
89 Farah, supra note 84, at S20. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at S21. 
94 See id. 
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salience of certain features[,] . . . this is equally true of other biological images, including 
micrographs, gels, and Western blots.”95 
iii. Correlation and Reverse Inferences 
 Many critics of current neuroimaging studies cite problems with correlation.96 In essence, 
this criticism posits that while it is one thing to localize a behavior to specific parts of the brain, it 
is another to cite that as an explanation for why and how humans behave.97 Farah answers this 
criticism, in part, with a clarification: new neuroscience largely consists of “methods [which] 
enable researchers to detect specific mental states and decode how specific stimuli or events are 
represented in the brain.”98 Perhaps, Farah asks, it would be better for such critics to ask if 
“functional brain imaging [can] contribute to confirming psychological hypotheses in roughly the 
way behavioral studies do?”99 “Many fruitful research programs,” she continues, “answer this 
question yes in the affirmative.”100 Indeed, psychologists have used neuroimaging to rule out 
certain hypotheses regarding the visual system’s involvement in processes relating to the 
perception of mental images in human memory.101 
Many believe that neuroimaging makes too many “reverse inferences,” where a small data 
point is extrapolated to a larger theory about behavior, when scientific confirmation usually 
requires the opposite.102 But these concerns are not unique to functional neuroimaging, and “any 
technology in which a specific cause is inferred from the presence of an effect . . . could have 
resulted from other causes.”103 So, given the current state of neuroscience, its benefits, and 
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limitations, it is best to think of these technologies as tools in the toolkit for understanding the 
organic causes of mental illness as opposed to the proof in and of itself.104  
D. “New Neuroscience” in Tort: A Prospectus 
 In beginning to discuss neuroscience’s potential in tort law, it should be noted that the 
majority of discussion surrrounding the subject is purely academic, and there has been little 
evolution in the way of actual courtroom activity.105 The area of the law that has seen the biggest 
impact from neuroscience thus far is criminal justice. Neuroscientific evidence has been used as 
mitigating evidence in capital crimes, and neuroscience-based rationales have informed Supreme 
Court decisions regarding minors in the context of sentencing.106 Neuroimaging research 
concerning the relationship between violent video games and violent behavior in children was 
considered by the Supreme Court in a case that involved a challenge to a statute that placed certain 
age restrictions on video game sales.107  
 The common theme in these cases is culpability and the requisite level of punishment 
associated with that culpability.108 It may follow that, if neuroscience can show that mental illness 
is organically caused, courts will be more inclined to impose a level of civil culpability 
commensurate with that condition, as appears to be increasingly commin in the criminal law. Of 
course, the differing stakes in capital crime cases as opposed to civil negligence actions where 
money damages are at stake may cut against this argument. 
 
104 Of course, the development of new technologies will blur this line even more. One such technology currently 
undergoing testing is “brain fingerprinting,” which purports to derive information that has been stored in the brain of 
a subject through their brain waves. Eggen & Laury, supra note 13, at 243. 
105 See, e.g., Stacey Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging in the Law: Trends and Directions for Future Scholarship, in 
LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 26, 27 (Owen D. Jones et al., eds. 2014) (briefly summarizing the scholarly exploration). 
106 See, e.g., Alabama v. Miller, 132 U.S. 2455 (2015) (explaining that “brain science continues to show fundamental 
differences between juvenile and adult minds”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (referencing 
neuroscientific studies in holding that death penalty for a minor at the time of a capital crime is unconstitutional). 
107 Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 852 (2011). The statute was found unconstitutional on 
First Amendment grounds. Id. at 800. 
108 See supra notes 98−99 and accompanying text. 
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 But scholars have repeatedly stated that “tort law is likely to be among the first areas of the 
law impacted by the neuroscience revolution.”109 Most notably, developments in neuroscience 
present the opportunity to show that mental disorders are legally tangible and worthy of (civil) 
judicial consideration. The ALI has recently admitted that many mental disorders have organic 
causes, but has retained the bifurcated rule for reasons of administrative feasibility and the 
perceived difficulty in recognizing “actual” mental disorders as opposed to “minor” personality 
defects or fakery.110  As previously mentioned, the results of some studies indicate these organic 
causes as it relates to certain mental disorders.111 
 Neuroscience can provide a crucial link between mental illness and culpability. But 
neuroscience also promises to aid tort law in other realms, such as providing a more precise 
determination regarding the extent to which a plaintiff may be experiencing pain.112 And some 
scholars have offered for a more “personalized” reasonable person standard informed by data and 
neuroscience.113 They advocate for the ultimate abandonment of an objective standard of care, 
identifying “several important efficiency advantages,” including furthering the objectives of tort 
law, corrective and distributive justice, and economic efficacy.114 
IV. Is it Possible to Bridge the Gap Between the Current Scientific Methods, Legal 
Rationales for the Bifurcated Rule, and Evidentiary Principles? 
 
 Despite the tremendous promise and excitement neuroscience offers in transforming tort 
law, a variety of barriers exist to entry. These include the state of the science and how to interpret 
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the technology, the relationship between neuroscience and evidentiary burdens, psychiatric, 
philosophical, and societal issues. All of these concerns will be briefly discussed in this Section. 
A. Scientific Criticisms of Evidence 
 When it comes to the use of fMRI studies showing brain abnormalities and the causes of 
mental illness, there is currently a lack of consensus regarding how to interpret the relationship 
between the observable Blood Oxygen Level Dependent Imaging (BOLD) and the conclusions 
made about the brain activity of mental states of subjects.115 Another source of skepticism is the 
relatively “speculative” nature by which scientists connect brain processes to neuroscientific 
measurements.116 This criticism is “particularly relevant to the kinds of normative judgment the 
law makes,” and poses a problem for evidentiary standards which tend to abhor speculation.117 
 In this vein, others point out the problems that comparing “averages of brain activity” as 
measured by fMRI pose in the legal context.118 “[T]he best neuroscience may be able to do is to 
say that, based on [one’s] current mental current mental condition or state, as shown by the current 
structure or functioning of [one’s] brain, [one is] more or less likely than the average to have had 
a particular mental state or condition in the time of the relevant event.”119 This concern is linked to 
another issue often levied at the current state of neuroscience—researchers often have difficulty 
replicating results over the course of multiple tests.120 Beyond worries about the science, 
neuroscience in the courtroom faces the practical hurdle of cost—as it stands today, the average 
 
115 See Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a 
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MED. 377, 382 (2007). 
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person could not to put on this type of evidence in an average civil trial.121 As a result of these 
concerns, some are skeptical of how close the law is to the general, widespread use of neurological 
evidence.122 
B. Evidentiary Burdens 
This pessimistic view towards neuroscience in the courtroom is illuminated by a survey of 
the evidentiary standards regarding scientific evidence. As it pertains to the admissibility of 
scientific evidence in federal court, the admissibility of scientific expert evidence is based on the 
Daubert test, which requires the weighing of a number of factors, including (1) the testing of a 
scientific theory through the principles of the scientific method; (2) peer review and publication; 
(3) rate of error; and (4) acceptance of the method in its particular field.123 This standard “is not 
particularly friendly to novel scientific evidence,” as “they are less likely to have been tested . . . 
the rate of error may not yet be known . . . and peer review or publication may not have been 
achieved.”124 
A minority of states have retained a less comprehensive standard than Daubert. This 
standard, referred to as the Frye test, requires only that the technology informing the scientific 
evidence at hand is “generally accepted” in the “particular field to which it belongs.”125 The 
relevant scientific community as it pertains to neuroscientific technology will be crucial in 
determining admission under this standard, although there will likely be a healthy dose of scientific 
skepticism to cut against acceptance regardless of that definition. 
 
121 See, e.g., supra note 1, at 625; Stephen J. Morse, Neuroimaging Evidence in Law: A Plea for Modesty and 
Relevance, in NEUROIMAGING IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM 341, 342 (Joseph R. 
Simpson ed., 2012) (stating that the use of neuroimaging in criminal cases appears to be scarce (though precise 
estimates of its use are difficult because of the propensity for criminal cases to end in plea bargains) at least in part 
because of the expense of the technology). 
122 See id. 
123 Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 597, 593 (1993). 
124 Eggen & Laury, supra note 13, at 281. 
125 Frye v. United Sates, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
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 Even where scientific evidence is reliable, an expert’s interpretation of scientific 
information must be relevant to the issues of a particular case in order for that expert’s testimony 
to be admitted.126 This creates an interesting “Catch-22” as it relates to the admission of 
neuroscientific evidence and the bifurcated rule. On the one hand, under the bifurcated rule, such 
evidence is irrelevant because the presence of mental illness is irrelevant. On the other hand, in 
order to make even a prospective argument that a defendant’s mental illness should  be considered 
in tort, neurological evidence would need to be contemplated. 
 Legal evidentiary standards have proven to be a difficult barrier to the admission of 
neuroscientific evidence in practice thus far.127 Most neurological evidence, like all scientific 
evidence, is screened by a judge before it may be presented to a jury.128 The judge is a “gatekeeper” 
for all scientific evidence and only after she determines the evidence admissible under the relevant 
standard may it be considered by the jury.129 Judges may be “hesitant” to admit neuroscientific 
evidence until “neuroscientiscists reach some degree of cohesiveness on the subjects.”130 In United 
States v. Semrau, for example, “the magistrate judge discussed at length fMRI evidence,” and then 
“proffered on the issue of veracity, in relation to the Daubert test, that ‘[although the expert] is 
qualified to offer an opinion . . . the testimony should be excluded, because, at least at this early 
stage in its development, fMRI based lie detection does not satisfy [its] requirements.”131 
 
126 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). 
127 See Eggen, supra note 19, at 642. 
128 See, e.g., Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom Evidence: On the Admissibility and Persuasiveness of 
fMRI, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 153, 153 (Owen D. Jones et al., eds. 2014) (noting that most fMRI evidence comes 
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129 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. 
130 Jane Campbell Moriarty, Flickering Admissibility: Neuroimaging Evidence in the U.S. Courts, in LAW AND 
NEUROSCIENCE 154, 154 (Owen D. Jones et al., eds. 2014). 
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 Some commentators also wonder whether judges will not admit such evidence due to 
concern that, “as with all new technologies[,] . . . neuroscience will dazzle the jurors who will 
inappropriately emphasize its value.”132 This could possibly be mitigated by “careful jury 
instructions indicating that information gleaned from fMRI and other studies is merely a single 
piece of evidence.”133 At this time, however, it is unknown exactly how much more persuasive 
fMRIs and other imaging evidence would be relative to verbal and written testimony.134 
C. Philosophical/Psychiatric Issues 
 Stephen J. Morse argues that there is also a fundamental philosophical barrier preventing 
the meaningful use of neuroscience in a legal context.135 Humans, he states, do not want to see 
themselves as “mechanical forces of nature,” rather, they want to see themselves as rational 
beings.136 As such, humans will naturally seek to discredit and reject evidence that may portray 
them to the contrary.137  
 There are a wide range of views to be found on this subject. Some argue that neuroscientific 
evidence threatens our fundamental concepts of “blame,” replacing it with a sort of biological 
determinism that, in essence, lets humans off the hook for their own actions.138 But some emphasize 
that moral responsibility can be normatively distinguished from the science of neural 
coordination.139 And Morse himself has conceded that he does not believe neuroscientific findings 
will actually alter human behavior.140 If anything, the discourse surrounding this topic shows that 
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scientists must develop better theories connecting cognitive variables and fMRI information, and 
that potential expert witnesses must hone their ability to draw inferences and support their 
scientific conclusions.141 
D. Societal Stigmas 
 Scholars have outlined reasonable arguments in favor of the preservation of the bifurcated 
rule. These arguments highlight the relative “stakes” of criminal versus civil law, debate the 
practicality of a unified rule, and most notably, argue that the law should reflect societal norms.142 
But it is difficult to disaggregate how those societal norms, and thus, how the law treats people 
with mental illness, are effected by societal stigmas towards mental illness.143 
 Mental health law in the United States is based on an assumption that “mental disorders 
may place a person at increased risk of physically harming himself or herself or others.”144 And for 
much of its history, the language concerning mental illness employed in many cases and the 
Restatements contained severe, negative terminology, including the words “lunatic,” “insane,” and 
“mental defective.”145 Some have even argued that the mere act of allowing mental health evidence 
in the courtroom serves to perpetuate these stigmas.146 
 This presents something of a vicious cycle when it comes to transforming tort law: fixing 
the bifurcated rule may ease societal stigmas, but societal stigmas may need to be eased before the 
bifurcated rule can be eliminated. It could be argued that law has the capacity, and even the 
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responsibility, to lead in this area; “classically, the ambition of legal regulation is to change 
behaviors,” often in conjunction with a sort of moral aspirationalism.147 But others would posit that 
the law should reflect current societal attitudes, and that a person’s motivation to follow the law 
stems from the codification of those norms.148 Regardless, transformation of the law as it pertains 
to the mentally ill and transformation of societal views towards mental illness must work hand in 
hand to be effective. 
V. To Effectively Transform Negligence Liability for Individuals with Mental 
Conditions that Impair their Behavior, Radical Change is Required 
 
 With the state of neuroscience and its relationship to tort laid out in brief, this Section will 
first evaluate proposals which argue for the unification of physical and mental conditions in tort. 
Then, it will highlight the deficiencies of other, alternative proposals. Finally, it will propose a 
new solution to the bifurcated rule, that a tort defendant should be required to prove their 
“significant” mental condition by a preponderance of the evidence in order to be factored into their 
relevant standard of care. 
A. The Starting Point: Unification of Physical and Mental Disabilities 
“The bifurcated rule should be replaced with a single duty rule for adults with disabilities, 
whether physical or mental.”149 Establishing a single rule would allow for one uniform standard 
for disabled adult defendants in negligence actions, and would also bring the law in line with 
standards concerning intentional torts, contributory negligence, and the child standards of care.150 
The universal applicability of a “significant and objectively verifiable” standard (that which is 
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currently applied to physical disabilities) to all disabilities would also serve to ease the 
administrative convenience concerns posited in the Third Restatement.151 
 But while “complete unification” would certainly be important symbolically as it pertains 
to the treatment of mental conditions in the law, it is neither significantly transformative nor 
commensurate with the current state of neuroscientific evidence. The “significant and objectively 
verifiable” standard does not properly balance the benefits and limitations of neuroscience-based 
evidence. It also leaves a sufficient likelihood that the current rationales for excluding mental 
conditions, such as that they are simply “too hard” to litigate and diagnose, will simply be applied 
to a standard that appears more inclusive, but is illusory in practice.152 In attempting to assuage 
fears about administrative feasibility, proponents of “complete unification” are simply trading 
those concerns for a new set of skeptical attitudes regarding neuroscientific evidence. Judges will 
likely use the rationales mentioned throughout this paper, including evidentiary relevancy, jury 
misuse, and a lack of objective causal evidence to ensure that the “significantly and objectively 
verifiable” standard is to high a bar for most defendants with mental conditions to clear. 
 It might be argued that when it comes to a change in the bifurcated rule, symbolism is 
really what matters. Professor Harry J.F. Korrell has stated that “a change would take the law 
another step toward humane accommodation of the mentally disabled. A rejection of the current 
rule would be a much needed, symbolic rejection that the courts are a place to turn for relief from 
the burdens of every misfortune.”153 He further posits that this sort of change would indicate a 
general acceptance of neurodiversity, a “recognition that there are risks inherent in living in a rich 
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and crowded society, which cannot properly be shifted simply because we prefer not to bear 
them.”154 
B. Other Proposed Changes to the Bifurcated Rule 
i. Mental Conditions With “Demonstrably Organic” Causes 
 Other scholars propose that mental conditions with “demonstrably organic” causes should 
be considered for the purposes of duty.155 Using a standard of “demonstrably organic” is meant to 
equalize mental conditions to physical ones and ensure that mental conditions are sufficiently 
“serious”. But this would have the effect of excluding “mental disabilities [which] may not be 
detectable as organic changes in the brain or other bodily organs.”156 Changing the standard from 
“demonstrably organic cause” to “objectively verifiable” purports to be more inclusive,157 but it is 
doubtful that such a technical legal change will really make a difference to the average jury, or 
even the average judge. 
ii. Modified Bifurcated Rule 
 Some scholars propose “an exception [or defense] to the objective reasonableness standard, 
rendering it slightly subjective when applied to adult defendants with relative cognitive 
impairments in claims of primary negligence.”158 This is an attractive option, as it attempts to 
balance flexibility with administrative feasibility, better aligns the rule with other tort 
considerations of mental condition, and comports with modern attitudes.159 But the proposed 
subjective requirements of a modified bifurcated rule leave much to be desired. Generally, these 
proposed standards parallel the criminal insanity defense, requiring that the defendant “could not 
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appreciate the consequences of or the risks posed by his conduct” or “lacked the capacity to act 
differently or refrain [from his conduct].”160  
 First, it does not follow logically that standards regarding mental conditions be equivalent 
in criminal and civil contexts, given that the burdens of proof are significantly lower in civil cases, 
and the stakes at issue are also radically different.161 Additionally, these standards seem to place a 
heightened burden on those with mental conditions as opposed to physical conditions. Rather than 
simply incorporate a mental condition into a reasonable person standard, they require a defendant 
to prove that they have little to control over their actions. If a blind man must act as a reasonable 
blind man would to avoid liability, as opposed to proving that he was completely incapacitated by 
his blindness, one with a mental condition should have to act reasonably relative to that condition, 
not establish that they are entirely incapacitated by it.  
iii. Forced Imposition of Strict Liability 
 It has also been posited that “courts should make decisions about liability in these cases 
only after consciously confronting the liability for what it is, faultless, and after arriving at the 
further conclusion, if it is possible, that strict liability is desirable and appropriate under the 
circumstances.”162 This seems to be, mostly, an affirmance of the status quo. This solution operates 
under the belief that, when forced to actively impose strict liability rather than follow black letter 
bifurcation law, judges and juries will be less likely to do so.163 But this fails to consider that the 
Hays rationales for the bifurcated rule have been followed blindly over time despite a relatively 
constant academic challenge, and that traditionally considered “administratively feasible” option 
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will often be chosen over the one that requires a more nuanced determination of liability, even if 
that feasibility is mostly imagined.164 
iv. Shifting Some Burden to Plaintiff 
 One final proposed solution to the bifurcated rule is for courts to impute a general 
knowledge of cognitive diversity (meaning, the knowledge that mentally ill people exist in society) 
on that plaintiff. This would effectively require a plaintiff to “anticipate or safeguard against the 
harm[s]” that cognitive diversity may pose.165 This builds on an earlier proposed modification to 
the bifurcated rule from Daniel Seidelson, who recommended that, similar to contract law, mental 
capacity should be considered where plaintiff had “actual or constructive” knowledge of 
defendant’s mental condition.166 
 It is argued that this imputation of knowledge woukld better bring a tort plaintiff’s access 
to remedies in line with current societal attitudes regarding mental illness.167 But it seems to be an 
end run around simply altering “reasonableness,” as well as an unnecessary logical stretch. Mental 
conditions are indeed “invisible” to the public in many places. Why burden the plaintiff with 
knowledge she may not have when it can instead be acknowledged that mental illnesses exist, have 
demonstrably organic causes, and may effect how a person behaves? 
C. A Sufficiently Transformative and Effective Solution 
 As previously outlined, the unification between physical and mental conditions for tort 
defendants is important for symbolic reasons, but the state of neuroscientific evidence is such that 
standards of proof cannot be simply subjective.168 As such, a defendant seeking to show a mental 
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condition in tort should be required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they suffer 
from a “significant” condition. Once this standard is met, the condition will be treated like a 
physical condition for the purposes of determining her standard of care. 
 It should be noted that a preponderance of the evidence standard as to “proving” mental 
illness is ostensibly lower than what is required to prove physical illness. This is by design; the 
fact of the matter is that, while organic causes for mental conditions are more objectively provable 
than they were previously, the state of the science is such that a standard such as “objectively 
verifiable” is almost impossible to clear. So, if the bifurcated rule is to be transformed in a way 
that allows for the consideration of new science, while also maintaining a healthy skepticism in 
support of the efficiency and fairness rationales it has elucidated in regard to mental illness, 
application of the preponderance of the evidence to mental health conditions is the most logical 
choice. 
 And this proposal still maintains two screens to prevent the preponderance of the evidence 
standard for mental illness from becoming too defendant-friendly. First, like all other scientific 
evidence, including evidence that pertains to physical conditions or impairments, neurological 
evidence must meet the relevant standard for admissibility, Frye or Daubert. This means that a 
judge is required to consider the benefits, criticisms, and scientific acceptance of specific 
neurological evidence before it can be presented to a jury.169 Second, the mental illness must still 
be objectively “significant” by a preponderance of the evidence. This prong of the analysis 
acknowledges that the diagnosis of mental illness is not, at this time, based wholly on organic 
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factors, and balances any potential biases resulting from stigma with an interest in differentiating 
legitimate mental illness from simple abnormalities in personality.170 
VI. Conclusion 
 The intersection of neuroscience and the law is at an all time level of import. But it is 
important to keep in mind that in the near future, the technologies and methods outlined in this 
paper will only improve, and new technologies will emerge. Over time, some of the concerns 
discussed in this paper may be resolved, while other new apprehensions emerge. What is for sure, 
however, is that as science, technology, and law continue to interact, different areas of the law, 
and the traditional legal conventions which underpin them, will be implicated. As the legal 
community faces these changes, it is important that its institutions react swiftly but thoughtfully, 
and with a proper dose of skepticism—not only towards new technologies, but also towards the 
possibly outdated notions which these technologies may threaten. And as neuroscience continues 
to infiltrate new areas of the law (tort included), care must be taken to properly balance the state 
of the relevant technology with the societal, ethical, and administrative goals of the law. 
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